Introduction
Regulatory capital standards have undergone tremendous amount of change in the past decades. Over time, regulators have gone back and forth on the issue of the type of capital standards and constraints that would ensure the soundness of the banking system.
In the early 1980s, banking regulators utilized a leverage requirement and required banks to maintain a fixed minimum amount of capital relative to total assets. (Gilbert et al. (1985) and Alfriend (1988) ). However, the leverage ratio proved to be risk insensitive. In 1988, U.S. bank regulators adopted the Basel I risk-based capital standards which were somewhat coarse and rudimentary. The revised Basel II Accord of 2004 sought more granularity by looking at risk weights from a credit rating approach and concurrently adopting the internal ratings based approach (IRB) that allowed banks to use their own proprietary internal risk models to determine their minimum capital requirements. (Basel (2004 (Basel ( , 2006 ). However, the 2008 financial and banking crisis showed that the risk based capital constraints were quite impotent in ensuring bank health.
As Haldane and Madouros (2012) point out, simple weighted measures such as leverage ratios appeared to have better pre-crisis predictability than risk based approaches.
There have been several empirical studies such as Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010) and Estrella et al. (2000) that show that leverage ratios perform better. Mariathasan and Merrouche (2014) have shown empirically that banks that rely on internal risk models and risk based ratios tend to have risk based capital that is low and risk weights that are inadequate. Their study provides empirical support to gaming or what they call strategic risk-modelling.
Theoretical work by Blum (2007) and Bischel and Blum (2005) show that a riskindependent leverage ratio is necessary to induce truthful risk reporting. The results of my paper align with these findings.
In this paper, I attempt to fuse the study of leverage ratio performance with monitoring of a profit maximizing bank. Using tools used in studying the industrial organization of banking my paper serves as a first step to tying the performance differences between the leverage and risk based constraints to the fundamental issue of monitoring. . Does a bank faced with a leverage based capital constraint monitor its loans better than under a risk based capital constraint ? In a market that is faced by dominant bank and fringe banks, I seek to understand if the dominant bank monitors its loan when faced with a Basel III style leverage ratio. The results of my study shows under certain parameter ranges, the dominant bank will monitor its portfolio when faced with a leverage based capital constraint. The dominant bank will not monitor its portfolio when faced with a risk based capital constraint.
The dominant-bank model with differential capital requirements for the dominant and fringe banks is presented in the next section (Section 2). In Section 3, I present the simulation results for the model where the dominant bank faces a leverage ratio and fringe banks face a risk based capital ratio. Section 4 presents simulation results.
Section 5 summarizes our results and evaluates their implications for future research.
The Banking Model and Analytical Solution
In this paper, I adopt the banking model of VanHoose (2013 VanHoose ( , 2010 VanHoose ( , and 1985 whereby the profit function for an individual bank i is given as follows: The profit maximizing bank faces two constraints. The first is its binding balance- 
where Γ is required leverage-based capital ratio of 6 percent. If the institution is a small, fringe bank, it confronts a Basel II-style, risk-based capital constraint:
where θ is the required risk-based capital ratio of 4.5 percent.
Consequently, there are two cases to be considered: (1) In each case, the analysis applies to a banking market with a dominant bank and fringe competitors. For the market's dominant bank (i = d), the first-order conditions for maximum profits in (1) yields
where the per-dollar expense in the wholesale funds market takes on both the role of the marginal cost of lending and the valuation of the marginal factor cost of funds at the profitmaximizing quantity of deposits. As shown in VanHoose (2013), which in turn draws from Blair and Harrison (2010) , the semi-reduced-form solution for the prevailing loan rate established by the dominant bank in the presence of a competitive fringe is given by 
where D s is the dominant bank's share of total market deposit funds, ε (>1) is the price elasticity of supply of the overall market supply of deposit funds,ζ (<0) is the price elasticity of demand for deposit funds on the part of the competitive fringe, and 0 < Ω ≤ 1.
I consider a setting in which the dominant bank faces exactly the same set of fringe banks in both the loan and deposit markets, so that s L = s D = s.
The solutions for the dominant bank's profit-maximizing balance-sheet quantities in the face of a binding leverage-ratio capital constraint are reported in Table 1 
Table 1 Goes Here
Substitution of the solution for the dominant bank's optimal net wholesale-funds borrowing position into (5) and (6) yields interdependent expressions for the market loan and deposit rates set by the dominant bank in light of the presence of the competitive fringe.
Solving these expressions jointly ultimately yields the reduced-form solutions for the loan and deposit rates reported in Table 2 . Both the market loan rate and the market deposit rate depend positively on the security rate and negatively on the rate of return on equity and the wholesale-funds rate, with the loan rate related to these rates through the markup parameter Λ and the deposit rate related to them through the markdown parameter Ω . All other structural parameters influence the retail loan and deposit rates established by the dominant bank including the leverage-based capital requirement ratio, Γ . Table 3 displays the optimal balance-sheet choices of a fringe bank. Like the dominant bank, the fringe bank's decisions depend on the various interest rates, with responses to changes in each of these interest rates dependent on the structural parameters applicable to the fringe bank. The solutions in Table 3 indicate that, as in the case of the dominant bank, a monitoring fringe bank's balance-sheet choices depend in part on the size of the marginal monitoring cost parameter that applies for fringe banks, c f . In contrast, a non-monitoring fringe bank's decisions depend in part on the loan default loss, δ f , that it faces.
Table 2 Goes Here

Table 3 Goes Here
Among the parameters influencing the balance-sheet choices of fringe banks is the risk-based capital requirement ratio, θ , imposed on the fringe banks by the regulator.
Nevertheless, because the leverage-based ratio, Γ , that the regulator imposes on the dominant bank influences the market loan and deposit rates, fringe banks also are indirectly affected by the magnitude of the leverage-based capital-requirement ratio as well. When I compare fringe bank profits with and without monitoring to determine whether the bank monitors its loans, structural parameters for both dominant and fringe banks influence their monitoring choice. Both capital-requirement ratios affect their monitoring decisions.
Simulation of the Model with a Leverage-Ratio-Constrained Dominant Bank and Risk Based -Ratio Constrained Fringe Bank
I conduct simulations to evaluate the model's implications when the dominant banks face the leverage ratio and fringe banks face a risk based capital constraint. I begin with the parameter configuration reported in Tables 4, which I refer to as the initial baseline case; these choices are similar to those considered in other studies, such as Kopecky and
VanHoose (2006) and VanHoose (2013) . An additional assumption utilized throughout the remainder of the paper is that the required reserve ratio, ρ , is at the 10 percent level.
Table 4 Goes Here
The top panel of Figure 1 displays the differential between the dominant bank's profits without monitoring and its profits with monitoring given the parameter configuration specified in Table 4 . To compute the dominant bank's profits without and with monitoring, these parameter values were substituted into the solutions for the dominant bank's profit-maximizing balance-sheet choices listed in the appropriate columns of Table 1 . The resulting values of the dominant bank's loans, securities, deposits, and equity were then substituted, along with the corresponding loan rate and deposit rate levels resulting from insertion of the parameter values into the solutions for these rates in Table 2 , into the dominant bank's profit functions without and with monitoring. The top panel of Figure 1 then displays the differential between the resulting profit levels at alternative market shares for the dominant bank. This non-monitoring/monitoring profit differential is negative below roughly a 91 percent market share for the dominant bank, which implies that that for our baseline parameters, the dominant bank receives higher profits when it monitors over this range of market shares. Above this market share, however, the profit differential is positive, which indicates that the dominant bank will receive higher profits by opting not to monitor above this market share. Hence, a more nearly monopolistic dominant bank is less likely to opt to monitor than one that faces a greater threat of competition from banks in the competitive fringe.
Figure 1 Goes Here
The key reason for the J-curve shape of the non-monitoring/monitoring profit differential in relation to the dominant bank's market share is that the spread between the loan and deposit rates widens as this market share increases. A higher market share for the dominant bank boosts the loan-rate markup while simultaneously reducing the deposit-rate markdown. This fact means that if the bank opts not to monitor, the proportionate effect on the dominant bank's profits of the loan default loss δ d , the value of which is invariant to the dominant bank's market share, diminishes as that market share rises in value. At the same time, however, even as the higher loan-rate markup boosts a monitoring dominant bank's profits with a larger market share, its total monitoring expenses increase as its aggregate loan portfolio expands with a rise in that share. This fact leads to the J-curve shape: As the dominant bank's market position moves closer toward monopoly, the diminishing profit effect of the default loss together with a growing monitoring expense tend to push it toward experiencing a net profit gain from shifting from a monitoring stance to opting not to monitor. These fundamental effects account for the tendency of this J- Figure 2 with the corresponding panel in Figure 1 indicates that this decrease in the value of c d is sufficient, holding all other parameters in the initial baseline simulation unchanged, to yield higher profits for the dominant bank that it opts to monitor over the depicted range of market shares. Comparing the lower panel of Figure 2 with the corresponding panel of Figure 1 shows that the contemplated reduction in the value of c f is sufficient to yield higher fringebank profits under monitoring for dominant-bank market shares below about 0.7. At higher market shares for the dominant bank, however, the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate established by the dominant bank is sufficiently large that the fringe bank's profits are higher if it opts not to monitor. Comparing the top panel of Figure 3 with the corresponding panel of Figure 1 indicates that in the face of such a substantial increase in exposure to loan losses, the dominant bank will shift to choosing a monitoring status over all relevant ranges of its market share. In addition, a comparison of the bottom panel of Figure 3 with the corresponding panel of Figure 1 shows that fringe banks reach to the significant rise in loan-loss exposure by opting to monitor up to a dominant-bank market share just over 0.8. Once again, as the dominant bank's market share rises beyond this level, the spread between the loan and deposit rates established by the dominant bank becomes sufficiently wide to push a fringe bank's non-monitoring profits above its profits with monitoring. Thus, at market shares higher than this level, fringe banks choose not to monitor. Figure 4 with the corresponding panel of Figure 1 indicates that raising this capital ratio generates a greater profit reduction in profits if the dominant bank chooses to monitor, with the profit-differential reduction being generated mainly via the resulting drop in the bank's lending that causes overall monitoring costs to drop and monitoring profits to rise.
Figure 4 Goes Here
Comparing the bottom panel of Figure 4 with that of Figure 1 shows that within the model, a tightening of leverage-based capital ratio faced by the dominant bank has virtually no spillovers onto the fringe banks. This is so because the effects of the increase in the leverage ratio imposed on the dominant bank have meager effects on the spread between the loan rate and deposit rate confronting the fringe banks. Given the underlying assumption that no other parameters faced by the fringe banks have changed, their monitoring incentives otherwise remain unaffected.
Simulations of Risk-Based-Capital-Constrained Dominant and Fringe Banks
Prior to the adoption of Basel III's leverage-based capital requirements for large banks, both the dominant and fringe banks tended most often to be constrained by the risk-based capital requirement ratios established under the Basel I and II frameworks. In this section, therefore, I consider an altered version of the model in which the dominant bank's portfolio choices are determined analogously to those of Section 3's fringe banks. In this setting, the optimal balance sheet choices of the dominant bank have the same forms of those reported in Table 3 but with the dominant-bank parameters replacing the fringe-bank parameters. For this case, in which the risk-based-capital-constrained dominant bank establishes the loan and deposit rates, the solutions for these rates reported in Table 5 apply.
Figure 5 Goes Here
The top panel of Figure 5 displays the differential between the dominant bank's profits without monitoring and its profits with monitoring given the parameter configuration specified in Table 6 . To compute the dominant bank's profits without and with monitoring, these parameter values were substituted into the solutions for the dominant bank's profit-maximizing balance-sheet choices listed in the appropriate columns of Table 3 . The resulting values of the dominant bank's loans, securities, deposits, and equity were then substituted, along with the corresponding loan rate and deposit rate levels resulting from insertion of the parameter values into the solutions for these rates in Table 5 , into the dominant bank's profit functions without and with monitoring. The top panel of Figure 1 then displays the differential between the resulting profit levels at alternative market shares for the dominant bank. This non-monitoring/monitoring profit differential is positive for all ranges of market share. This implies that that for our baseline parameters, the dominant bank receives higher profits when it does not monitor over the entire range of market shares. Hence, a risk based capital constraint results in no monitoring by the dominant bank. The bottom panel of Figure 5 indicates that for our baseline set of parameters on Table 6 , fringe banks always choose not to monitor at any level of the market share held by the dominant bank.
When comparing this outcome with that seen in Table 1 , we find that under certain conditions and parameters, a risk-based capital constraint imposed on both the dominant bank and fringe banks mitigates monitoring. This result implies that that under certain parameter vales, the leverage-ratio capital constraint performs better in inducing monitoring in a dominant bank.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Moving forward from a Basel I and II into a Basel III framework, banks are poised to face differential capital requirements under the Basel III regime. In this paper, I adopt a simple bank balance sheet model to uncover the implications of differential capital constraints and its impact on the banks' monitoring decision. Given that the Basel III leverage ratio will impact the biggest banks first, I segment my banking market into one that consists of a dominant bank(s) and fringe banks and consider two scenarios. In my first scenario, the dominant bank faces a leverage ratio while the fringe bank faces a riskbased capital ratio. Under this first scenario and certain parameter values, we find that the dominant bank is induced to monitor its loans while the fringe does not monitor. In the second scenario, both dominant and fringe banks face a risk-based capital constraint. In this scenario and specific parameter values, I find that the dominant bank fails to monitor regardless of its market share. The model employed in this paper uses a very simple balance sheet model. Hence, one needs to be careful in stretching the policy implications. However, under certain parameter values and ranges, this paper finds that the leverage ratio induces better monitoring outcomes for dominant bank(s). We do not see it inducing monitoring outcomes for the fringe banks.
This paper does not suggest that the leverage ratio should exclude other risk-based capital constraints. However, given some of the deficiencies in risk-based ratios, this paper points to the direction that dominant banks ( 
